Cal Law Trends and Developments
Volume 1970 | Issue 1

Article 10

January 1970

Community Property and Family Law: The Family
Law Act of 1969
Aidan R. Gough

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw
Part of the Family Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Aidan R. Gough, Community Property and Family Law: The Family Law Act of 1969, 1970 Cal Law
(1970), http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/10
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Cal Law Trends and Developments by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.

Gough: Community Property

Community Property and
Family Law: The Family
Law Act of 1969
by Aidan R. Gough*
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II. Background
III. Marriages-Valid, Voidable and Void
* I am grateful to Professors Judith
McKelvey, Ruth Miller and Henry
Schmidt of Golden Gate College School
of Law for their patient assistance, and
to R. Blair Reynolds, Esq., Vice-President and General Counsel of the California Land Title Association for his
helpful commentary on the new law.
I must also acknowledge an especial
and continuing indebtedness to Professor Herma Hill Kay of the University of California at Berkeley and Richard C. Dinkelspiel, Esq., of the San
Francisco Bar; over the happy years of
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our friendship and shared work, their
thought and counsel have formed my
own to an extent not recompensed by
frequent citation.
** A.B., 1956, A.M., 1957, Stanford
University; J.D., 1962, University of
Santa Clara; LL.M., 1966, Harvard University; Professor of Law, University of
Santa Clara. Formerly Executive Director, Governor's Commission on the
Family, and presently adviser on marriage and divorce law to the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
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I. Introduction

The year 1969 marked the decade's principal accomplishment in family law, the passage of the Family Law Act. The
last several years have seen a sharply rising discontent with
our traditional procedures for handling the dissolution of
marriages, and numerous reform proposals have been advanced both in this country and abroad. 1 The Family Law
Act brings some of these proposals to fruition; it marks the
first legislative eradication of marital fault as the governing
principle of divorce in any American jurisdiction.
Because the passage of the new law virtually eclipses the
past year's decisional developments in family law and community property, this article will attempt to focus on its highlights in summary form, not to provide an exhaustive catalogue
of all its points, but rather to set out its structure and indicate
some directions of future growth.
II. Background

This full-scale revision of California's divorce laws came
nearly 100 years after their framework was laid down in 1872,
and had its roots in the work of the Assembly Interim Committee on Judiciary in 1964. With the help of a Citizen's
1. For some recent comparison and
discussion of these proposals, see Stone,
Moral Judgements and Material Provision in Divorce, 3 Family L.Q. 371
(1969); Kay, A Family Court: The
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California Proposal, 56 Cal. L. Rev.
1205 (1968); Bodenheimer, Reflections
on the Future of Grounds for Divorce,
8 J. Family L. 179 (1968).
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Advisory Committee, the Assembly group surveyed several
areas pf family law and recommended a number of legislative
changes.- On May 11, 1966, Governor Edmund G. (Pat)
Brown convened the Governor's Commission on the Family
under the Co-Chairmanship of then-Assemblyman Pearce
YoungS and Richard C. Dinkelspiel of the San Francisco Bar,
directing it to prepare a complete revision of the law governing divorce and its consequences, and to develop recommendations for a family court system for California. 4 The Commission's recommendations and proposed drafts were published in December, 1966, and were introduced as proposed
legislation in 1967 and 1968. 5 After two years of interim
study by the legislature and refinement and reworking by the
State Bar Family Law Committee, the proposals were introduced as Senate Bill 252 in the 1969 legislative session by
Senator Donald L. Grunsky, chairman of the Senate Committee on Judiciary and a member of the Governor's CommISSIon. A proposal differing on a number of substantive
points was introduced in the Assembly as Assembly Bill 5308
by Assemblyman James Hayes, chairman of the Assembly
Committee on Judiciary.
Each proposal, Senate Bill 252 and Assembly Bill 530,
passed its house of origin and was then held in committee in
the other house. The Senate refused to concur in Assembly
amendments conforming the Senate Bill to the Assembly
proposal, and consequently the measures were referred to a
conference committee composed of three members from each
house. 7 The conference committee favored the Assembly
2. See Assembly Interim Committee
on Judiciary, Final Report On Domestic Relations (1965; hereafter cited as
Assembly Interim Report).
3. Now Judge of the Superior Court,
Los Angeles County.
4. Report of the Governor's Commission on the Family 1 (1966) (hereafter cited as Gov. Comm. Report).
See Kay, supra n.1; Dinkelspiel and
Gough, A Family Court Act for Contemporary California: A Summary of
CAL LAW 1970
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the Report of the Governor's Commission on the Family, 42 Cal. St. B.J.
363 (1967).
5. 1967: S.B. 826 (Grunsky), A.B.
1420 (Shoemaker); 1968: S.B. 88
(Grunsky).
6. A.B. 530 (1969) was a revised version of an earlier bill which Mr. Hayes
introduced in 1968 as A.B. 487.
7. Assembly Report on Assembly
Bill No. 530 and Senate Bill No. 252,
Assembly Daily Journal, California
275
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version on a number of points and the net result was the
enactment of a revised version of Senate Bill 252 as Chapter
1608 of the Statutes of 1969, with Assembly Bill 530 enacted
in amended form as Chapter 1609, intended as a "trailer
measure" to clean up loose ends by amending Chapter 1608.
Both enactments received the signature of the Governor on
September 4, 1969, and the new Family Law Act is thus an
amalgam of the two bills.
III. Marriages-Valid, Voidable and Void
The provisions of the new Act concerning marriage and
its solemnization (Sections 4000-4300 of the Civil Code)
carryover prior law virtually unchanged. 8
In the provisions now governing the judicial determination
of a void or voidable marriage, some changes have been made
and their effects are not entirely clear. Prior law provided
that marriages which were knowingly bigamous or incestuous
were void ab initio. 9 Though they needed no judicial action
to render them nUll,l° a proceeding by way of declaratory relief
could be had to establish the fact of nullity, if it were desired. l1
Section 4400, of the new Act preserves the definition of incestuous marriage and section 4401, makes only minor and
insubstantial changes in the definition of bigamy.
However, section 4450 of the Act provides that proceedings
"based on void or voidable marriage" shall be commenced by
the filing of a petition for a judgment of nullity. When this
section is read in parity with section 4500 (3), which provides
that marriage is dissolved by a judgment of nullity, and section 4429, which provides that the effect of such a judgment

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/10

Legislature-1969 Regular Session, August 8, 1969, at page 2. Most of the
testimony at the numerous hearings
held over three years remains unpublished, and the Assembly Report provides the most succinct legislative history and best reflection of legislative intent. It is hereafter cited as 1969 Assembly Report.
S. Previously Civ. Code §§ 55-79.09.
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To minimize confusion with prior sections, citations to the new law are given
as Family Law Act § - .
9. Former Civ. Code §§ 59, 61 and
80.
10. For a discussion of the prior law,
see 1 Armstrong, California Family
Law, pp. 32-41 (1966 Supp.).

11. Former Civ. Code § 80.
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is to restore the parties to the status of unmarried persons,
some doubt is raised as to whether the legislature intended to
make judicial declaration a sine qua non to the nullity of a
bigamous or incestuous marriage. 12 This interpretation is
not required by the language, however, and would run counter
both to prior law and to the legislative statement that no substantial departure from it was intended in this area,13 as well
as affronting the plain meaning of sections 4400 and 4401.
The favored interpretation would thus be that the judicial
declaration of nullity would not dissolve the marriage, but
would simply record the ineffectiveness of its attempted formation.
Similar confusion exists with respect to the nullification of
voidable marriages, those in which an impediment exists at
the time of the ceremony but which are good until annulled.
The former provisions establishing the bases for the annulment of voidable marriage have been carried over intact in
section 4425, of the Family Law Act. 14 Under prior law, the
annulment of a voidable marriage "related back" and made
the marriage a nullity from its inception (save for certain
specific provisions legitimating children of such marriages).15
Do sections 4429 and 4500 (3) mean the eradication of the
doctrine of relation back and the establishment of a new tenet
that nullification is effected only prospectively, from the date
of the decree?16 In view of the preceding law and the statement of legislative intent,17 this seems unlikely.
12. Kay (tape), The New California
Family Law Act, side 1 (Legal Information Program, Bancroft-Whitney,
Inc., 1969). One notes that the standard manuals on legal bibliography are
devoid of instruction on the art of citing auditory references (apart from the
common "interview with
.").
In this McLuhanesque age, it is
likely that "See" as an introductory
signal will have to be supplemented by
"Hear." Finding no other reference to
taped materials, I have hereby taken
the liberty of inventing my own format.
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13. 1969 Assembly Report, pp. 7-8.
14. The prior law was contained in
former Civ. Code § 82.
15. Former Civ. Code § 85; see generally 1 Armstrong. California Family
Law, pp. 41-84 (1966 Supp).
16. Kay (tape), The New California
Family Law Act (Legal Information
Program,
Bancroft-Whitney.
Inc.
1969).
17. 1969 Assembly Report, pp. 7-8.
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I believe that the Family Law Act's preservation of the
separate treatment of voidable marriages is a regrettable and
needless archaism; the Act's provisions in this regard depart
both from the original version of Senate Bill 252 and from
the recommendations of the Governor's Commission. 1s The
historic differences in consequence between void and voidable
marriages have their roots in the property concerns of a fardistant day,t9 and the annulment of a voidable marriage presents the same essential question as the dissolution of a marriage whose formation is whole: namely, is the defect so
serious that the marriage has broken down? If its gravity is
not of that order to the parties and they can live with it, the
marriage is viable. No public policy compels its dissolution.
If, on the other hand, the situation cannot be borne by those
who find themselves in it, then why should not the matter
be treated like any other dissolution of marriage under the
new law, by the breakdown-of-marriage standard? To allow
the differential treatment of voidable marriages on the old
grounds is, in my judgment, to erode the newly-adopted standard of breakdown, and to run the risk of letting in the side
door the corpse of the marital fault standard which we have
painfully striven to drag out the front.
In section 4452, the Act gives statutory recognition to a
concept long-enshrined in California decisional law, the protection of the putative spouse. lIO The section defines a putative
spouse as one who enters either a void or voidable marriage
in good faith (thus giving some support to the argument advanced above that the new Act does not abolish the doctrine
of relation back in cases of voidable marriage). Further, it
provides that all property which would have been community
property or quasi-community property if the parties had been
validly married shall be classified as "quasi-marital property,"
and divided according to the rules for the division of community property between lawfully married spouses. 1 An
18. Gov. Comm. Report, pp. 35-37.
19. See Goda, S.l., The Historical
Evolution of the Concepts of Void and
Voidable Marriages, 71. Family L. 297
(1967).
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278

ZO. See generally 1 Armstrong, California Family Law, pp. 862-867, 869870 (1966 Supp).
1. Family Law Act § 4800.
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addition to prior law is found in section 4455, which provides
for an order of support in favor of a putative spouse. Though
the section is headed "alimony pendente lite; innocent party,"
the statute provides that either during the pendency of the
action or upon judgment the court may order support for the
putative spouse in the same manner as if the parties had
been lawfully wed, provided that other criteria are met. 2 Thus
it seems clear that the legislature intended to allow provision
for support after a declaration of nullity, which had not been
permitted by previous law. s On this point, it is significant
to note that section 4516, which deals with temporary alimony
on dissolution of marriage, omits mention of the phrase "or
upon judgment" which is found in section 4455.
IV. Dissolution of Marriage
The chief contribution of the new Family Law Act, and
one which the Governor's Commission and virtually all the
legislators involved in its passage agreed was critical, was
the elimination of the traditional doctrines of marital fault
as the determinants not only of divorce and separate maintenance, but of the consequences of property division and
2. These other criteria create their
own confusion: 1) The parties must
be "putative spouses" (which surely
must have been intended to apply only
to the spouse seeking support-it hardly makes sense to deprive an innocent
spouse of the right to support because
her (or his) mate had not acted in good
faith); 2) the party seeking support must
be innocent of fraud or wrongdoing in
entering the marriage; and 3) he or she
must be free from knowledge of a prior
marriage or other impediment. The
last two requirements seem to have
been carried rather thoughtlessly from
former Civ. Code § 87. If-as § 4452
requires-a putative spouse must have
acted in good faith, isn't the third standard (and perhaps the second as weB) superfluous?
3. This comports with the recom-

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1970
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mendations of the Governor's Commission, Gov. Comm. Report, p. 75. Even
temporary alimony was previously unavailable when the marriage was void,
In re Cook, 42 Cal. App. 2d 1, 108 P.2d
46 (1940). Attorney's fees and costs
(suit money) could be ordered in an annulment action (i.e., involving a voidable marriage) pursuant to former Civ.
Code §§ 87, 137.3 and perhaps in a
declaration of nullity action (i.e., involving a void marriage) as well. Cf.
Dietrich v. Dietrich, 41 Cal.2d 497, 261
P.2d 269 (1953) cert. den. 346 U.S.
938, 98 L.Ed. 426, 74 S.Ct. 378. Family Law Act § 4456 clarifies this and extends to proceedings to declare a void
union null; whether the marriage is
void or voidable the applying party
must meet essentially the same standards as those discussed above.
279
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support as well. 4 To underscore the point, the terms "divorce"
and "separate maintenance" are done away with; the new law
substitutes "dissolution of marriage" and "legal separation"
in their stead. The Governor's Commission and Senate Bill
252 had proposed a single standard for the dissolution of
marriages, namely that dissolution be granted when the court
found that the legitimate objects of the particular marriage
had been destroyed and there existed no reasonable likelihood
of reconciliation. 5 This language was derived from the landmark case of De Burgh v. De Burgh,6 and had the advantage
of the gloss of that encyclopedic opinion as to what factors
bore on a determination of irremediable breakdown.
Different language prevailed in the enactment, though the
purpose was kept, and section 4506 of the new law provides
two standards for dissolution of marriage or legal separation,
(l) incurable insanity and (2) irreconcilable differences
which have caused the irremediable breakdown of the marriage. Incurable insanity is the Ol1ly ground carried over from
prior law,7 but two changes have been made. First, the old
law required that the incurably insane spouse have been confined continuously in an institution for the three-year period
immediately preceding the filing of the complaint; the new
provision removes the requirement of specified confinement
and simply requires that the spouse must have been at the
time of filing of the petition, and remain, incurably insane. s
Second, the new law eliminates the requirement of testimony
by a member of the hospital staff of the institution where the
insane spouse was confined, and allows proof of insanity by
any competent medical testimony.9 The reasons for retaining
the insanity standard are not wholly clear; many have thought

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/10

4. 1969 Assembly Report, p. 5; Gov.
Comm. Report, pp. 26-32.
5. Actually, this is not quite an accurate statement. Senate Bill 252 provided that the court would dissolve the
marriage unless it found that the legitimate objects of matrimony had not
been destroyed because there was a
reasonable likelihood that the marriage
280

could be saved.
1969).

(§ 4615, S.B. 252,

6. 39 Cal.2d 858, 250 P.2d 598
(1952).
7. Former Civ. Code § 108.
8. Family Law Act § 4510.
9. Family Law Act § 4510.
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that the breakdown-of-marriage standard evidenced by irreconcilable differences is sufficiently broad to subsume the few
cases brought on this ground in the past. 10 The Assembly
Report is not convincing on the point; it merely observes that
"one who is incurably insane falls into a wholly different category than one who provokes an irreconcilable difference."ll
This may be true enough, but if we really mean to abolish
the fault doctrine it is difficult to see its pertinence.
Section 4507 of the Family Law Act defines the other
(and chief) basis for dissolution, irreconcilable differences,
as "those grounds which are determined by the court to be
substantial reasons for not continuing the marriage and which
make it appear that the marriage should be dissolved."
Though somewhat solipsistic, the language makes its apparent that the essential question the court must resolve in a
dissolution proceeding is whether the marriage has irretrievably broken down, and that breakdown in turn shall be gauged
by the evidence of irreconcilable differences.
The same two bases serve for legal separation, but contrary to the prior law, under the Act a court cannot decree
legal separation unless both parties agree thereto, or one party
has filed a petition for legal separation and the other fails to
make a general appearance. 12 This accords with the view of
the Governor's Commission that separate maintenance all too
often promotes illicit relationship and the evasion of support
obligations. 13 The statute provides that even if a decree of

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1970

10. Cf. 1969 Assembly Report p. 5;
Kay (tape), The New California Family Law Act, side 1, (Legal Information
Program,
Bancroft-Whitney,
Inc.
1969). In 1966, the last year for which
complete data are available, only 33 divorce complaints out of a total of 95,538 filed were based on the ground of
incurable insanity. Bureau of Vital
Statistics, Calif. Dept. of Public Health,
Divorce in California-l 966, p. 175,
table 63.
11. 1969 Assembly Report p. 5.
12. Family Law Act § 4508 (b).
CAL LAW 1970

13. Gov. Comm. Report p. 33. We
viewed this as a forthright recognition
of a current problem, and perhaps some
even preened a bit at our being progressive thinkers. It is more than a little
sobering, as one reflects on the significant progress made by the enactment of
the Family Law Act, to read the words
of Sir Arthur Conan Doyle upon the
subject, written in 1909:
[Judicial separation is a product of casuistical hypocrisy] "promoting illegitimate births, and a wretched attempt (0
compromise between the crying needs of
281
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legal separation is entered, either party may subsequently file
for, and receive, a judgment of dissolution of marriage. a

V. Procedure and Evidence
Concomitant with the abolition of the fault grounds, the
new law has made substantial changes in the procedure for
obtaining a judgment of dissolution of marriage or a judgment
of nullity. The change most immediately apparent is in the
form of the pleadings: no longer are marital severance cases
commenced by a traditional adversary complaint styled
"
... vs. . . . . . .. ." Whether the action is for dissolution of marriage, legal separation or to establish nullity, it is
now initiated by a neutral petition captioned "In re the
marriage of . . . . . .. and....... .,,15 While the change
is of minor effect when viewed against the whole scope of
the need for reform, and while alterations in form by wordsmithery will hardly prevent destructive contests, it is nonetheless significant in setting the tone by which the proceedings
are to be conducted-more akin to an inquest upon the dead
marriage, as the Mortimer Commission of the Church of
England put it,16 than to the traditional adversary trial having
as its ostensible point of factual focus the question of whether
husband struck wife exactly twice, leaving marks.17
As the Bar is by now well aware, the Judicial Council has
adopted a standard form of petition, in check-the-box form, to
be used throughout the state in all marital severance cases.
This document calls for information on relevant vital statistics, the marital property, and the custody of children. It
neither calls for nor permits the pleading of specific acts
of misconduct. 1s Section 4504 of the Act permits a single
human life and the objection of the
theologians. "
Doyle, Divorce Law Reform, p. 6
(1909), in P. Nordon, Conan Doyle,
pp. 68-69 (1967).

14. Family Law Act § 4508 (b).
15. Family Law Act § 4503 (petition
for dissolution of marriage and legal

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/10 282

separation), § 4450 (petition for judgment of nullity).
16. Report of Commission Appointed by the Archbishop of Canterbury,
Putting Asunder: A Divorce Law for
Contemporary Society, p. 67 (1966).
17. See Virtue, Family Cases in
Court, pp. 86-91 (1956).
18. Family Law Act §§ 4506, 4509.
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responsory pleading, which must be filed and served within
thirty days of the date when respondent was served with the
petition and summons;. the demurrer has been removed from
this phase of California domestic relations practice by court
rule. l9 The Judicial Council has also established other standard forms for use in practice under the Act. 20
As pointed out above, one of the chief goals of the new
Family Law Act was to reduce the adversary aspects of a
proceeding which is inherently divisive and too often acrimonious. Thus the Assembly Report on the new law observes,
"To eliminate lurid testimony and acrimony, it is essential
that the pleadings and evidence and discovery proceedings be
strictly controlled."l
Unfortunately, it is open to question whether the statutes
achieve this desirable stringency of control. Section 4509,
provides that evidence of specific misconduct is improper
either in pleading or proceedings generally, and section 4520,
renders inadmissible in any marital severance action any
evidence collected by "eavesdropping" (the term has a kind
of quaint flavor in these days of sophisticated "debugging"
devices and "bugs" which can outwit them). But section
4509, also provides two exceptions to the rule excluding
evidence of particular misbehavior: such evidence may be admitted where child custody is in issue and the Court believes
19. Judicial Council of California,
California Rilles of COllrt, Rule 1215.
The 30-day period for response is extended from the 10 days allowed under
previous practice and conforms to the
new Jurisdiction Act, Code of Civ.
Proc. §§ 410.10-418.10, effective July
I, 1970.
20. The forms are: Petition; Response; Summons; Confidential Questionnaire (for use in counties operating
conciliation courts); Order to Show
Cause; Request and Declarations re:
Default; Interlocutory Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage; Final Judgment;
and Notice of Entry of Judgment. In
counties where the Confidential QuesCAL. L.AW 1970
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tionnaire is required, petitioner may
complete the Bureau of Vital Statistics
Divorce Registry Form in lieu of completing questions 1-29 of the Questionnaire. Judicial Council of California, California Rilles of COllrt, Rule
1224 (1969). A significant omission
seems to be the lack of a form whereby a child or third party (e.g. a grandparent) could bring an Order to Show
Cause in re: Contempt for failure to
provide support; the Order to Show
Cause adopted pursuant to Rule 1285
is couched only in terms of Petitioner
and Respondent.
1. 1969 Assembly Report, p. 6.
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the evidence relevant to the determination of that issue, or
it may be admitted where it is determined by the Court to
be necessary to prove the existence of irreconcilable differences. This latter exception would seem to raise at least
two questions.
First, it remains to be seen-as the new law is tested in
practice-whether the Bar and Bench will cling to accustomed
ways and deem such specific evidence "necessary" to the proof
of irreconcilable differences in the majority of cases.
Second, it remains similarly to be seen precisely how the
case for irreconcilable differences will be presented, and what
the witnesses will say. With the elimination of the timedishonored requirement of corroboration2 and the introduction
of this new basis for marital dissolution, what Professor Herma
Hill Kay has termed "conclusionary testimony"3 would seem
both inevitable and proper. The existence of differences, and
especially the irreconcilability of those differences-which is
really to say the marriage's breakdown vel non--can only be
assayed by those two spouses on whom they bear. For the
Court to accept these proffered conclusions of irreconcilable
differences does not diminish the judicial role; it remains the
role of the Court to guard against hasty and ill-conceived
decisions about the breakdown of the marriage and the irrep arability of the parties' breach. But when it really comes
down to it, only the parties can determine whether their union
is irremediably broken, and the Court ought to accept as
the basis for its judgment their conclusions-or the conclusions
of one of them-seriously reached. That this is the intent
of the new law is explicitly shown in the Assembly Report. 4
2. The requirement of corroboration
found in former Civ. Code § 130 has
been eliminated by Family Law Act §
4511.
3. Kay (tape), The New California
Family Law Act, sides I and 2 (Legal
Information Program, Bancroft-Whitney, 1969).
4. 1969 Assembly Report, p. 6:
". . . absolute refusal on the part of
one spouse to live with the other, de-

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/10
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spite a conciliatory attitude on the part
of the latter, was thought by the great
majority of legislators and witnesses
considering the question to be a sufficient reason for dissolution. In that
situation the court could hardly justify
a refusal to grant an order of dissolution since the marriage certainly has
broken down. Refusal would amount
to a legal perpetuation of a relationship which has ceased to exist in fact."
CAL LAW 1970
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There may be some question as to whether a hearing is
actually required, or whether in a default proceeding the
decree of dissolution can be granted on affidavits. The prior
law provided that evidence of grounds not adduced in vivo
before the court was to be presented by written questions
and answers under oath, but with the requirement of corroboration defaults upon affidavit were effectively barred. 5 In
section 4508, the new enactment speaks of a hearing to establish the existence of irreconcilable differences, but talks
of proof upon affidavit in section 4511.6 There is no express
requirement for hearing in the statute; the Rules of Court are
also silent on the point but provide, in Rule 1249, that if the
course of the proceeding is not specifically dictated by statute
or rule, the court may adopt any suitable process or mode
or proceeding that conforms to the spirit of the law.
Thus it is possible that proof by affidavit might be upheld
in default or uncontested matters, though it seems unlikely
in view of the prior law and practice, and to my mind would
be unwise; the court's responsibility to assess the irreparability
of breakdown cannot be fulfilled by reading a formulaic writFamily Law Act § 4508 mandates the
court to continue the proceedings for a
period of not more than 30 days if it
finds that there is a reasonable likelihood of reconciliation. At any time
thereafter, either party may move the
entry of the decree and the court may
enter judgment. The legislative history and obvious intent of the act are
clear-not to mention the prior law,
which held refusal to enter a decree
reversible error once a ground for divorce had been proven and absent
proof of a defense. Kirkpatrick v.
Kirkpatrick, 152 Cal. 316, 92 P.
853 (1907); cf. De Burgh v. De
Burgh, 39 Cal.2d 858, 250 P.2d 598
(1952). Therefore it would seem clear
that to refuse a decree where reasonable possibilities for reconciliation did
not exist, that is to say where the 30day continuance had proven unproductive of reconciliation, would be to in-
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vite appellate overruling. See Code of
Civil Procedure § 1770 et seq. for the
function of the Court of Conciliation.
Nevertheless, and probably inevitably, "war stories" of aberrant judicial
denials are already in circulation. I
was informed by one more-than-usually
loquacious counsel that he was stunned
into a rare silence when the judge announced, in a pronunciamento from the
bench, that in his view no differences
were irreconcilable unless they were
based on deep ideological rift-"for
example, where you have a communist
married to a Catholic." Needless to
say, his case didn't fit that model and
a hurried continuance was obtained.
5. Former Civ. Code § 130.
6. The section speaks of "proof of
the grounds alleged," an unfortunate
inadvertence since it hearkens back to
the fault grounds now done away with.
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ten statement any more than it can by hearing the usual testimoniallitany. On any hearing on a question of fact, the court
may conduct the proceedings in private if it finds this necessary to protect the "interests of justice and the persons involved."7
The new Act preserves procedures for temporary orders
in dissolution and child custody cases, but makes several
changes. Section 4516, authorizes temporary support but
adds to former laws a provision that temporary orders operate
without prejudice to the rights of parties or children with respect to subsequent orders, an attempt to keep the temporary
order from freezing the base of support for future and permanent orders. It also changes the time from which an order
of modification or revocation is effective, from the date of
the order itself to the date of filing of the notice of motion or
order to show cause. Enforcement procedures are covered
by section 4540.
Ex parte protective orders are covered by section 4518,
which attempts to codify the ex parte motion practice developed pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 527;
two additions are of significant importance. First, it provides
that an order of restraint may be directed against all but ordinary and usual expenditures, and if this is done, the respondent spouse must notify the moving spouse of any "proposed
extraordinary expenditures" and account therefor to the court.
Second, it provides that an order may be made excluding
either spouse from the family dwelling or from the dwelling
of the other, but only upon a showing that physical or emotional harm would otherwise result; under prior law, the court
could make orders of temporary exclusion but was afforded
no standard by the empowering statute. 9 This lack worked

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/10

7. Family Law Act § 4519; the section is roughly cognate with the closure provisions of the Juvenile Court
Law found in Welf. & Instits. Code
§ 676.
8. Former Civ. Code § 137.2.
9. Former Civ. Code § 157. Curiously, Family Law Act § 4518 appears
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to apply only to nullity, legal separation, and dissolution proceedings, thus
possibly excluding some actions for
child support or child custody not connected with dissolution or legal separation (for example, brought pursuant to
Family Law Act § 4603). Other sections speak of "any proceeding under
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two evils: some courts took the view that a showing of physical
jeopardy was required and denied restraining orders unless
there was evidence of antecedent physical violence; on the
other hand, some courts routinely excluded husbands simply
as a precaution even where there were no indications that
physical or psychological harm would flow from his continued
presence.
Sections 4512-4515, of the new enactment maintain an
interlocutory period-now shortened to six months from the
date of service of summons and petition or appearance of the
respondent party-and the nunc pro tunc decree procedures
of the prior law. In my judgment, this preservation of an in~
terlocutory period is regrettable, and it ignores the strong
recommendations both of the Assembly Interim Committee
on Judiciary in 1965, and of the Governor's Commission on
the Family.lO A "cooling-off" period placed after the decree
effectively terminating the marital relationship is hardly an
apt device to conduce reconciliation, and its retention will
continue the uncertainty and obstruction of property transfers
which have accompanied it in the past. 1l
Section 4530 of the new Act, reduces the residence requirements for procuring a decree of dissolution to six months in
the state and three months in the county; like the former law,
it provides that jurisdiction may be based on the residence of
either party.12
Provisions relating to attorney's fees and costs are carried
over from the old law in sections 4525 and 4526 of the Act,
this part" (e.g., § 4517, dealing with
payment of obligations directly to creditors) and there seems no justifiable
basis for the narrower application of §
4518. Compare also cognate provisions on temporary exclusion in Family
Law Act § 5102.
10. Assembly Interim Report, p. 125;
Gov. Comm. Report, pp. 23-24.
11. Assembly Interim Report, p. 125;
Gov. Comm. Report, pp. 23-24.
12. Former Civ. Code § 128. The
prior law (Civ. Code § 128.1) relating
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to lack of residential requirements for
separate maintenance has been carried
over and applied to actions for legal
separation in subsection (b) of § 4530,
which also provides for conversion of a
decree of legal separation into a decree
of dissolution upon motion of either
party after fulfilment of the requisite
residential time. Section 4531 provides
for separate domicile, carrying over intact the substance of former Cal. Civ.
Code § 129.
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without major substantive change. ls One clarification should
be noted, however: the broad enforcement provisions contained in section 4540 apply to any proceeding under the
Family Law Act and allow the court to utilize execution,
attachment, contempt, the appointment of a receiver and such
other remedies as it may deem necessary in aid of its orders.
Therefore, they apply to proceedings relating to the enforcement of orders setting attorney's fees, and clarify the implication of prior law that enforcement of such orders was limited
to writs of execution. l4
VI. Child Custody and Support
The law governing child custody and visitation rights is
set forth in sections 4600-4603 of the Family Law Act, and
it is likely that no California statute has consumed more time,
effort, and discussion in its drafting than section 4600, which
sets the standards for custody awards. This section maintains
the controlling criterion of the "best interests of the child"
found in prior law, both decisional and statutory, when the
contest as to custody is between parents. 15 It also creates a
system of preferences, which the court "should" (not "shall")
follow, and whose net effect is largely to continue the three
different standards of existing law in three different types of
situations. 16 Where the contest is between parents, the "best
interests of the child" standard governs, as noted, with subsection (a) of section 4600 giving an apparently absolute
preference to maternal custody if the child is of tender years,
other things being equal. 17 The old law's preference for
13. See former Civ. Code §§ 137.3
and 137.5.
14. See former Civ. Code §§ 137.3
and 137.5.
15. See former Civ. Code § 138;
Crater v. Crater, 135 Cal. 633, 67 P.
1049 (1902). On the standards of child
custody generally, see 2 Armstrong,
California Family Law, pp. 960-992,
esp. 968-973 (1966 Supp.).
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16. For a similar preferential ranking in connection with the appointment
of a guardian, see Probate Code § 1407.
17. For discussion of the phrase
"other things being equal," see Lawrence v. Lawrence, 165 Cal. App.2d
789, 332 P.2d 305 (1958), Munson v.
Munson, 27 Cal.2d 659, 166 P.2d 268
(1946).
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paternal custody if the child were old enough to require occupational nurture and training has been abolished. Is Apparently, maternal preference was made absolute as between
parents to deter custody litigation by fathers where there was
little likelihood of success. I9
When the contest is between a parent and a non-parent, the
new Act essentially continues-with some change of emphasis
-the "dominant parental right" doctrine of the old law.
Under prior decisions, a court could deprive a parent of custody in favor of a third person only upon a finding that the
parent was unfit. 20 The new law requires a finding that the
award of custody to the parent would be "detrimental to the
child." This change reflects an uneasy accommodation between the wish to avoid the excessively harsh and stigmatizing requirements of the prior law, and the need to guard
against a Painter situation in which the court might prefer a
"stable" non-parent over a parent, without justifiable basis.I
Precisely how much good will be accomplished by the alteration in wording remains to be seen, but as Professor Kay has
observed, to the extent that it focuses attention upon the
quality of the essential parent-child relationship rather than
upon the vices of the parent, it will be helpfu1. 2
18. Former Civ. Code § 138.
19. 1969 Assembly Report, p. 9.
20. Stewart v. Stewart, 41 Cal.2d
447, 260 P.2d 44 (1953). On the "dominant parental right" doctrine generally,
see 2 Armstrong, California Family
Law, pp. 993-1006 (1966 Supp.).
1. Painter v. Bannister, 258 Iowa
1390, 140 N.W.2d 152, (1965); cert. den.
385 U.S. 949, 17 L.Ed.2d 227, 87 S.Ct.
317. The Iowa Supreme Court's preference for the maternal grandparents
over the father, who had temporarily
placed his son with them after the
mother's accidental death and had remarried, was based on its disapproval
of the father's "Bohemian" and intellectual mode of life in California; it
was even rumored, the court noted, that
CAL LAW 1970
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the father might move to Berkeley!
This result was later overturned in the
California Superior Court in Santa
Cruz County by an order making the
father guardian of his son's person and
awarding him custody. Order 22077,
Super. Ct., Santa Cruz Co., August
28, 1968.
2. Kay, "Limits of the Current Reform: The California Family Law Act
and the English Divorce Reform Bill,"
in P. Bohannon (ed.), Divorce and
After (publication pending, Doubleday
& Co., 1970). Compare In re A.J.,
274 Cal. App.2d - , 78 Cal. Rptr. 880
(1969); Nadler v Super. Ct., 255 Cal.
App.2d 523, 63 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1967).
Family Law Act § 4600 provides that
allegations of parental custody resulting in detriment to the child shall only
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When the contest as to custody is between two third persons, subsections (b) and (c) of section 4600, provide in
essence that the "best interests of the child" standard is the
determinant, with preference to be given to a person in whose
home the child has been living in a stable and wholesome
environment. 3
Ultimately, the controlling standard remains the welfare
of the child, and even the maternal preference is subject to it.
Prior law permitted the court to take account of the child's
wishes regarding custodial placement if the child had sufficient capacity to form an intelligent preference;4 the new
Family Law Act requires the court to consider the child's
wishes if it determines that the child has sufficient age and
capacity to reason so as to form an intelligent preference.
Parental visitation rights are secured by section 4601, unless
it is shown that visitation would be detrimental to the child's
best interests, and the court is empowered to award in its
discretion visitation rights to any third person having an interest in the welfare of the child-a startlingly broad provision. s Section 4603 of the Act provides for an action to vest
exclusive custody in a parent without the necessity of filing a
petition for dissolution of the marriage; this addition is without analogue in the prior law.
Former Civil Code section 138, which enunciated the standards for custody determination, applied only to actions involving a divorce or separate maintenance. The provisions
of Family Law Act section 4600 apply to all custody determinations, including those stemming from a petition for declaration of nullity of a void or voidable marriage.
be pleaded by a statement of that ultimate fact. However, in view of the
specific exception for child custody matters in the ban on evidence of particular acts of misconduct contained in §
4509, it is doubtful that this safeguard
has much meaning or that it will work
significant changes in practical emphasis.
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3. For discussion of the importance
of a stable environment in a custodial
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contest between parents, see Norton v.
Norton, 112 Cal. App.2d 358, 245 P.2d
1108 (1952); Fine v. Denny, 111 Cal.
App.2d 402, 244 P.2d 983 (1952).
4. Former Civ. Code § 138.
S. It is far broader than Civ. Code
§ 197.5, which allows the court to grant
visitation rights to a grandparent upon
the parent's death. Apparently the old
section remains on the books despite
the Family Law Act.
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Finally, the legislative history, as announced in the Assembly Report (which purported to speak to the final enacted
version of the bills), simply does not square with the language
of the statute. 6 It states, inter alia, that "[l]imitation of the
power . . . to award custody of children to persons other
than a parent is the primary intent of the provisions in the
.", and goes on to say that the "best interests
new act.
was abolished because it is
of the child" standard ".
amendable [sic] to the same type of application as occurred
in the Painter case. m This is not only confusing but flatly
inaccurate: as shown above, the "best interest" standard is
expressly retained by subsection (a) of section 4600, to govern
contests between parents, and it did not apply as the governing
standard in contests as against a third person.
The new law sets forth no criteria for modification of prior
orders of custody, and presumably the "change-of-circumstances" rule enshrined in existing law will continue to govern. s
The Family Law Act reenacts, in sections 4700-4703, the
substance of the prior law relating to child support without
major change. Though the Governor's Commission on the
Family had suggested the repeal of section 196 of the Civil
Code, because of its unequal allocation of responsibility for
support between the father and the mother, its recommendation was not followed and that section remains in force despite
the new enactment. 9 Termination of alimony and of child
support obligations upon the happening of a specified contingency are treated separately in the new law, rather than conjointly as they were under former Civil Code section 139.8.10
Section 4701 adds to the law a provision allowing the
court to order wage assignments in child support cases. This
provision, based on the Governor's Commission recommenda6. 1969 Assembly Report, p. 8.
7. 1969 Assembly Report, p. 8.
8. Exemplary of the many cases
establishing that there must be a
change of circumstances before modification of a custody decree is warranted, is Olson v. Olson, 95 Cal. App.
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594, 272 P.l113 (1928). See generally
2 Armstrong, California Family Law,
973 et seq. (1966).
9. Gov. Comm. Report, p. 51.
10. Family Law Act § 4700(b)
(child support); § 4801(d) (alimony).
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tions, follows closely the provisions of Wisconsin law, where
the experiment has apparently proven quite successful. l l In
a similar vein and also following the Governor's Commission
recommendations, the Act requires, in section 4702, that
in any case where the custodial parent is receiving welfare
support, the court shall direct payment of child support to
a designated county official and shall direct the district attorney to appear in behalf of the welfare recipient in any proceeding to enforce the order. I2 The new statute removes the 5
percent collection fee allowed by existing law. Is
VII. Property Rights of the Parties: Division of Property and
Support

Of all the provisions of the Family Law Act, section 4800,
on the division of property, is likely to prove the most cumbrous in practice and the most productive of vexing litigation. Under prior law, community property could be divided
unequally, with the lion's share going to the "innocent" spouse
if the divorce were granted on the ground of extreme cruelty,
adultery, or incurable insanity.I4 Since the ground of extreme
cruelty alone accounted for roughly 96% of all divorce filings,
punitive allocation was the rule rather than the exception
(absent a property settlement agreement, and often even with
one).15 This division based on marital misconduct is antagonistic to basic community property theory, and has impelled
countless spouses to tout about for evidence of their mate's
misdeeds in order to secure for themselves the greater portion, while at the same time it has moved an equally countless number to agree to extortionate and unrealistic demands
in order to fend oft' that proof. Because of these conditions,
and having in mind the fact that a mathematically equal division is seldom possible and probably less often desirable, both
the Governor's Commission and the earlier version of the
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11. Gov. Comm. Report, p. 52;
Wisc. Family Code § 247.265 (1969
Supp.).
12. Gov. Comm. Report, p. 53.
13. Former Civ. Code § 139.5.
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14. Former Civ. Code § 146(1).
15. Bureau of Vital Statistics, Calif.
Dept. of Public Health, Divorce in
California-1966, p. 175, table 63.
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Senate Bill called for an equal division except where the court
should find that economic circumstances made such equal
division impracticable or unjust, and then permitted unequal
division upon specific findings delineating the warranting
economic factors. IS Even the earlier Assembly version of the
Family Law Act called for essentially equal division unless
the court found it unreasonable or impracticable, and allowed
the family residence to be set aside to the wife who won custody of minor children. 17
These measures were not adopted, however, and in my
judgment our movement from those points has been retrograde rather than progressive. As enacted, the new law
calls for equal division of the community property and quasicommunity property, with two exceptions. The court may
award any asset on such conditions as it may deem proper
to effect a substantially equal allocation/ 8 and further, it may
make an award by way of offset from existing property in any
amount it determines to have been "deliberately misappropriated" to the exclusion of the other party's community interest. 19 The phrase "deliberately misappropriated" is not
further defined, and seems unfortunately susceptible to a wide
stretch of meanings, most based upon attempted proof of
fault which allows much undercutting of the spirit of the new
law and may restore the motivation for fixing blame which
we have sought to remove.
It will be immediately apparent that the application of this
section raises far more questions than the section provides
answers for, and indeed, even the bounds of the questions are
now only dimly perceived. What is the court to do when the
only real assets consist of a miniscule equity in a tract home,
16. Gov. Comm. Report, pp. 44-46,
111; S.B. 252 § 4900( a), as amended
3/17/69.
17. A.B. 530, § 4800, as amended
4/10/69.
18. Family Law Act § 4800(1). The
phrase "if the division of property is
in issue," found in the introductory
paragraph to section 4800 and referCAL LAW 1970
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ring to the court's power to make a
property division after the interlocutory judgment upon proper reservation
of jurisdiction, is ambiguous and unclear. Presumably, it means "to the
extent that there is property subject
to the disposition of the court."
19. Family Law Act § 4800(2).
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a battered car worth perhaps one fourth of that amount, and
a few meagre furnishings on which much yet remains to be
paid? It is hardly feasible to argue that the court might hold
open the proceedings for an indefinite time and assign the
use of the residence to the wife during the minority of the
children, nor is it any more satisfactory to say that the wife
be given the home outright and then required to reimburse
the husband over a period of time for his share. One thousand dollars paid over time is hardly the same thing as one
thousand dollars paid in hand, and this form of division is
not equal. In the great majority of cases, it would seem to
me, forced sale of the residence is likely to be the least desirable alternative in terms of social consequences to the wife
and minor children.
I believe that this problem of the family home is one of the
most pressing difficulties presented by the new enactment.
Several routes of solution suggest themselves. First, the court
could make a presently unequal award (e.g. 60%-40%)
of the equity in order to compensate for the deferred realization of the husband's share in a time-reimbursement scheme,
in effect using a "real present value" basis which would take
account of the interest factor. Or the court could give the
equity in the home to the husband in return for a present right
of occupancy given to the wife until the youngest child reached
majority and some mandate that he sustain the payments and
not sell or otherwise transfer his interest in the premises without her consent. Or the wife could be given the right of immediate possession and continued occupancy of the home as
security for the husband's obligation to pay child support,
pursuant to the provisions of section 4700 of the Act, if good
cause for the giving of security were shown. Also, as at least
one commentator has suggested, the provisions of the new
law may bring a far greater use of the homestead process,
since section 4808 (a) provides that a homestead selected
from community or quasi-community property may be set
aside either absolutely or for a limited period to either party,
and section 4808 (b) provides that a separate property homehttp://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/10
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stead may be set aside to the spouse other than its owner for
a limited period. 20
Of course, the parties may agree to an unequal division
of the community in a property settlement agreement, so that
the equity in the home could be set over to the wife even though
its value exceeds the aggregate worth of the remaining assets.
The property settlement agreement would appear to be the
best answer to the problems presented by the present form of
the statute, but it has at least two drawbacks: it will make
dissolution proceedings more costly, and this will probably
hit hardest against those who are least able to pay for the
additional lawyering involved in the drafting of the agreement;
and it obviously will not work where the parties cannot agree.
(Based on a very limited experience, I believe that it is at least
as difficult to draft a workable property settlement agreement,
and often harder to achieve agreement between the parties,
where the assets are scant than where they are fairly substantial.)
Other problems obtrude. For example, what of the case
where the principal assets are an equity in the home worth
$20,000 and a new closely held business with a capitalization
of $40,000, present indebtedness of $80,000, and great prospects for the future? Does the term "community property"
subsume debts for the purpose of the Act's provisions on property division? Presumably so. But how can we justify the
allocation of an equal share of debt to a wife who still has
minor children with her, has not worked in some time and
cannot readily reenter the labor market, and who will be subsisting for at least a time on the alimony and child support
monies she received from the husband? Is she to be expected
to make up her share of the debt from those payments? And
if we say no, and attempt to work some reduction in alimony
to compensate for not saddling her with the debt, are we doing
any better?
It is quite clear that at least some judges view the requirement of precisely equal division of community interests as
20. Kay (tape), The New California
Family Law Act, side 4 (Legal InCAL LAW 1970
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formation Program, Bancroft-Whitney,
1969).
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virtually an absolute requirement, and an accurate and objective evaluation of each item of the community property as a
necessary concomitant of that division. 1 Some are of the
opinion that formal appraisals will be required, and have
instructed counsel to so advise their clients.2 The reverse
of the standard Judicial Council Form for Request and Declarations re: Default (Marriage) contains a schedule and
financial statement calling for the value of each asset and the
amount of each obligation subject to the court's disposition. 3
The requirement of formal appraisal will obviously add
greatly to the cost of many marital dissolution proceedings,
and it seems most unreasonable for the court to reject a valuation agreed to by the parties in the absence of some indications of fraud or overreaching, or a wholly inappropriate basis
of calculation. Similarly, it is stupefying to consider that a
court might require that each asset and piece of property be
scheduled and valued; I strongly suspect that the courts of
California will accept lump evaluations of household furnishings at sums ascribed by the parties, and will not devote themselves to an extended calculus of the worth of the bath towels.
Yet, one cannot discount the possibility that the court might
require outside appraisal on its own motion where the assets
are sufficiently complex, and it appears that the practicing
Bar will have to take account of this contingency. We may
have substituted for (or rather, added to) the open warring
of spouses and the occasional skirmishing of psychiatric witnesses what Assemblyman Hayes has termed the disputing
of two appraisers-a doubtful gain indeed. At the least, the
statute would be improved by emendation expressly permitting
a substantially equal division of the property; whether so
1. See, e.g., the remarks of Judge
William Mac Faden of the Superior
Court in Los Angeles County, quoted
in the news report of a Family Law
Act Seminar in the Los Angeles Daily
Journal, October 14, 1969, pp. 1 and
7.
2. The same news story (see note 1,
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supra) reports Assemblyman James
Hayes, author of Assembly Bill 530,
as agreeing with Judge MacFaden on
this point.
3. Form adopted by the Judicial
Council of California, California Rules
of Court, Rule 1286, effective January
1, 1970.
CAL LAW 1970

24

Commuuity Property and Family Law
Gough: Community Property

amended or not, the provisions of the new law make proper
tax planning critically important.
The substantive provisions of existing law relating to community property and quasi-community property are carried
over fundamentally intact in Title 8 of the Act, sections
5100-5138. Also essentially unchanged is the law relating
to property settlement agreements; as remarked above, the
equal division requirements of section 4800 do not appear
to apply to property settlement agreements in the face of section 4802, empowering the spouses' concurrence with respect
to the division of the property of their marriage upon its dissolution. 4
There are two other relatively minor changes in the law
relating to the property rights of husbands and wives. Section 5113.5 of the Act, originally added as section 164.8 of
the Civil Code in the 1969 session, provides that transfers
made inter vivos to certain revocable trusts shall remain community property and was presumably added to deal with the
problems raised by the Katz cases. 5 Then, doubtless as a reflection on (or of) our Aquarian age, the new Family Law
Act adds section 5108, which has best been described as a
"Married Man's Separate Property Act."s Former Civil Code
section 162, enacted in 1872 and now embodied in section
5107 of the new law, had long secured the woman's right to
convey her separate property, but there was no cognate provision for the male of the species because his power was never
doubted. Now that it, too, has been secured, has it by that
process been called into question? As Shakespeare put it,
the "equality of two domestic powers breed scrupulous faction!,,7
4. The new enactment does not
change the prior statute, former Civ.
Code § 159.
5. Katz v. U.S., 382 F.2d 723 (9th
Cir. 1967) reversing Katz v. U.S., 255
F. Supp. 642 (S.D. Calif. 1966). See
Comment, Status of Community Property in the Revocable Inter Vivos Trust,
7 Santa Clara Law 148 (1966).
CAL LAW 1970
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6. Kay (tape), The New California
Family Law Act, side 4 (Legal Information Program, Bancroft-Whitney,
Inc., 1969).
7. Antony & Cleopatra, Act I,
scene 3, line 47.
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The substantive provisions of the old law relating to alimony
and the determination of the award have also been transferred
to the new, in section 4801, with only minor changes. 8 The
new law mandates the court to consider two matters not
specifically required to be taken into account under prior law,
( 1) the duration of the marriage and (2) the ability of the
supported spouse to engage in gainful employment without
jeopardizing the interests of any children in her custody.9
Though these criteria were not spelled out in the prior statute,
they have long been recognized as proper for the court's consideration in fixing the alimony award and it seems unlikely
that the new enactment will work any substantial change in
practice, though the new law should provide some curb to
the occasional aberrational judgment and provide a readier
hinge for a finding of abused discretion upon appeal. 10
Though the Family Law Act sections on alimony, like those
on child custody, are silent as to criteria for modification of
prior awards, it seems certain that the existing law requiring
a change of circumstances will apply.l1 The new law does
change the effective date of modification or revocation from
the date of the order to the date of filing of the notice of
motion or order to show cause to modify.12 Section 4801 (a)
of the Act speaks of modification or revocation "as the court
may deem just and reasonable," rather than "at the discretion of the court," as prior law had it. 13 The change is not
thought to be significant, and if anything would restrict rather
than enlarge the court's power.
8. Former Civ. Code § 139 (Family
Law Act § 4801(a), (b) and (c»; § 139.8
(Family Law Act § 4801 (d»; § 139.7
(Family Law Act § 4801(e».
9. Family Law Act § 4801(a).
10. Although the case law has
recognized these factors as material,
accuracy would probably demand the
statement that they have been applied
protectively more often than not. See,
e.g., Brawman v. Brawman, 199 Cal.
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App.2d 876, 19 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1962);
Mueller v. Mueller, 144 Cal. App.2d
245, 301 P.2d 90 (1956).
11. Snyder v. Snyder, 219 Cal. 80,
25 P.2d 403 (1933). On the modification of alimony awards under previous
law, see 1 Armstrong, California
Family Law, pp. 371-385.
12. Family Law Act § 4801(a).
13. Former Civ. Code § 139.
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VIII. Application of the Law
Inevitably, one of the most immediate problems of the
Family Law Act is the matter of its application. The statute
provides that its effective date was January 1, 1970, and that
it would apply: (1) to all proceedings filed on or after that
date; (2) to all proceedings held after that date in actions
in which an interlocutory or final decree had not been rendered; and (3) to all proceedings in progress on or commenced
after that date for the modification or revocation of prior
orders.l4 Challenges to the constitutionality of these provisions have not been long in coming, but no problems of retroactive divestment of rights in deprivation of due process
or equal protection appear to be seriously presented. 16
IX. Epilogue
Taken in sum, California's new Family Law Act is a distinctly significant step in the quest for a rational system of
state intervention in the marriage relationship. The decisions
in Griswold v. Connecticut,16 Loving v. Virginia,17 and in an
important and controversial California case during the last
year in the field of abortion, People v. Belous,ls are a reminder
that the rights to privacy inhering in the commitment of persons to each other, particularly in the bond of matrimony,
are of a very high order; as the Governor's Commission expressed it, the family is the essential basis of our society and
marriage is a commitment in depth and complexity between
two freely consenting parties. 19 The law must intervene only
upon a compelling ground of interest, and with great care.
The Family Law Act attempts, not always successfully but
14. Stats. 1969, Ch. 1608, § 37, as
amended by Stats. 1969, Ch. 1609,
§ 29. See also 1969 Assembly Report,
pp. 10-11.
15. The press informed us that perhaps the first attack on the new law
was made by Mrs. Robert Cummings,
wife of the actor.
San Francisco
Chronicle, January 20, 1970, p. 5.
CAL lAW 1970
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16. 381 U.S. 479, 14 L.Ed.2d 510,
85 S.Ct. 1678 (1965).
17. 388 U.S. 1, 18 L.Ed.2d 1010,
87 S.Ct. 1817 (1967).

18. 71 Cal.2d - , 80 Cal. Rptr. 354,
458 P.2d 194 (1969).
19. Gov. Comm. Report, p. 60.
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certainly more gainfully than the prior law, to balance the
tension between these individual rights to privacy and the
constraining interests of the state in enhancing the family
unit and in seeing that children are minimally harmed by its
dissolution.
I believe that much remains to be done, and that the Family
Law Act is a beginning point rather than a terminus. The
Governor's Commission recommendations for the creation
of a family court division in each county's Superior Court, to
be equipped with a professional staff, would have centralised
litigation on family matters that are now spread over several
judicial calendars. The family court division proposal not
only expanded the geographic coverage of the Courts of Conciliation, but their scope and function as well, since the professional staff was empowered under the proposal to undertake dissolution counseling as well as counseling directed toward reconcilement. 2o (That is to say, counseling of the parties
when dissolution appeared inevitable but the parties wished
assistance in reducing their areas of problem or disagreement
and in adjusting to their new roles in life). These proposals
were not adopted, but it is to be hoped that attention will
be given to them in coming legislative sessions. One hopes,
too, that the provisions regarding the annulment of voidable
marriages will be coalesced into the process for dissolution
provided in the Act, that the ineptitude of the interlocutory
period will be abandoned, and that the standard of property
division can be brought round to a more adroit expression.
These are perhaps the most obvious needs.
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20. Gov. Comm. Report, pp. 11-14,
20-22, 24-25. Perhaps it is appropriate
here to set at rest a prevalent misconception:
neither the suggestions of
the Governor's Commission nor the
provisions of the Senate Bill contemplated mandatory counseling, as
has frequently been charged.
The
initial recommendations called only
for a required initial evaluative interview, so that the parties could be informed of the available resources; this
was later modified to include only
300

families with children under 18. All
counseling was to be voluntarily undertaken, and the 1969 Assembly Report's
conclusion (at page 3) that the report
of the counselor would be determinative on the question of dissolution flies
directly in the face of the language of
the Governor's Commission:
"[I]t
must be stressed that we regard it as
absolutely essential that the decisional
process be kept the province of the
court, not the counselor."
Gov.
Comm. Report, pp. 20-2l.
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Nevertheless, the Act remains a good step. Appellate
gloss and legislative reworking will doubtless dampen even
more the stimuli for bitterness and acrimonious exchange
with which the prior law was so fraught, and which the new
Act strives-in large measure successfully-to remove. The
Family Law Act is a massive venture; in terms of its complexity and of the number of people it affects, it is perhaps
the largest legislative reform effort successfully undertaken
in the history of this State. It is a safe prediction that progress
will continue to be made.
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APPENDIX A
CROSS-REFERENCE TABLES
Prepared by R. Blair Reynolds, A.B. University of California (Berkeley), J.D. 1966, Hastings; formerly Counsel to the
Senate Committee on Judiciary and presently Vice-President
and General Counsel, California Law Title Association. They
are reprinted here with the permission of that body.

FAMILY LAW ACT (Chapters 1608 and 1609,
Statutes of 1969)
TABLE I. Correlation of Former to New SectioDS
NOTE: In the following table, sections marked with an asterisk {*}
have been carried over in the new law without substantive change.
Where the letter "N" appears, the section was repealed without
adding any comparable provision in the new law.
Former
Section
Civ.C
55* ....... .
56 .........
56.1 * .......
57* ........
59'" ........
61 .........
62 .........
63'" ........
68'" ........
69 .........
69 a'" .......
69b'" .......
69.5'" .......
70* ....... .
71* ....... .
72'" ....... .
73'" ....... .
74'" ....... .
76* ....... .
77* ....... .
78'" ....... .
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New
Section
Civ.C
4100
4101
4102
4103
4400
4401
N
4104
4200
4201
4202
4203
4204
4205
4206
4207
4208
4209
4210
4211
4212

Former
Section
Civ.C
79* ........
79.1* ., .....
79a'" .......
79.01 * ......
79.02* '" '"
79.03'" ......
79.03a'" ., ...
79.04'" ..... ,
79.05'" '" " .
79.06'" ......
79.07'" ......
79.08'" ......
79.09'" ......
80 .........
82 .........
83'" ........
84 .........
85'" ........
86'" ........
87* ........
88* ........

New
Section
Civ.C
4213
4214
4215
4300
4301
4302
4303
4304
4305
4306
4307
4308
4309
4450
4425
4426
4453;4454
4453
4451
4456
4457
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New
Section
Civ.C
4500
4501
92 ........ . 4506
93 ........ . N
94 ........ . N
95 ........ . N
96 ......... N
97 ......... N
98 ......... N
99 ......... N
100 ......... N
101 ......... N
102 ......... N
103 ......... N
104 ......... N
105 ......... N
106 ......... N
107 ......... N
108 ......... 4510
111 ......... N
112 ......... N
113 ......... N
114 ......... N
115 ......... N
116 ......... N
117 ......... N
118 ......... N
119 ......... N
120 ......... N
121 ........ . N
122 ........ . N
123 ........ . N
124 ........ . N
125 ........ . N
126 ........ . N
127 ........ . N
128 ........ . 4530 (a)
128.1 ...... . 4530 (b)
129* ....... . 4531
130 ........ . 4511
131 * ....... . 4512;4521
131.5* ..... . 4513
132 ......... 4514
133 ........ . 4515
136 ........ . 4502
137 ........ . 4503
137.1 * ..... . 4703

Former
Section
Civ.C
90* ....... .
91'" ....... .
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Former
Section
Civ.C
137.2 .......
137.3 .......
137.5'" ......
137.6* ......
138 .........
139 .........
139.1 *
139.5
. ....
139.7*
139.8*
140* . .......
140.5* . .....
140.7'" . .....
141'" . .......
142 . ........
143* . .......
144 . ........
145 . ........
146 . ........
147'" . .......
148* . .......
149 . ........
150* . .......
150.1 *
150.2'"
150.3*
150.4*
155* ........
156* ........
157 .........
158* ........
159* ........
160* ........
161* ........
161a* .......
161b* .......
162* ........
163 .........
163.5'" ......
164* ........
164.5*
164.6* ......
164.7'" ......
165* ........
166* ........

New
Section
Civ.C
4516;4540
4456;4525
4526
4517; 4540
4600
4540; 4700(a); 4801(a),
(b) & (c); 4811
4700(c); 4812
4702(b) & (c)
4801(e)
4700(b); 4801(d)
4700(a); 4800; 4801(a);
4540
4803
4804
4805
4806
4807
N
N

4800;4808
4809
4810
149
5000
5001
5002
5003
5004
5100
5101
4518(3); 5102
5103
4802
4802
5104
5105
5106
5107
5108
5109
5110
5111
5112
5113
5114
5115
303
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Former
Section
Civ.C
167* ........
168* ........
169* ........
169.1 * ..... .
169.2* ..... .
169.3 .......
170* ........
171* ........
171 a'"
171b'" ...... .
171c* .......
172'" ....... .
172a'" .......

TABLE

Former
New
Section
Section
Civ.C
Civ.C
4000 ....... . (new)
4001 ....... . (new)
4100 ....... . 55
4101 ....... . 56
4102 ....... . 56.1
4103 ....... . 57
4104 ....... . 63
4200 ....... . 68
4201 ....... . 69
4202 ....... . 69a
4203 ....... . 69b
4204 ....... . 69.5
4205 ....... . 70
4206 ....... . 71
4207 ....... . 72
4208 ....... . 73
4209 ....... . 74
4210 ....... . 76
4211 ....... . 77
4212 ....... . 78
4213 ....... . 79
4214 ....... . 79.1
4215 ....... . 79a
4300 ....... . 79.01
4301 ....... . 79.02
4302 ....... . 79.03
4303 ........ 79.03a
4304 ....... . 79.04
4305 ........ 79.05
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Former
Section
Civ.C
172b* . ......
173* . .......
174* . .......
175 .........
176 .........
177* . .......
178* . .......
179* . .......
180* ........
181'" ........
182* . .......
199'" ........

New
Section
Civ.C
5116
5117
5118
5119(a)
5119(b)
5126
5120
5121
5122
5123
5124
5125
5127

n.

New
Section
Civ.C
5128
5129
5130
5131
5132
5133
5134
5135
5136
5137
5138
4603

Derivation of New Sections

New
Former
Section
Section
Civ.C
Civ.C
4306 ........ 79.06
4307 ........ 79.07
4308 ........ 79.08
4309 ........ 79.09
4400 ........ 59
4401 ........ 61
4425 ........ 82
4426 ........ 83
4429 ........ (new)
4450 ........ 80
4451 ........ 86
4452 ........ (new)
4453 ........ 84; 85
4454 ........ 84
4455 ........ (new)
4456 ........ 87; l37.3
4457 ........ 88
4500 ........ 90
4501 ........ 91
4502 ........ 136
4503 ........ 137
4504 ........ (new)
4505 ........ (new)
4506 ........ 92
4507 ........ (new)
4508 ........ (new)
CCP
4509 ........ 426b
Civ.C
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New
Former
Section
Section
Civ.C
Civ.C
4510 ....... . 108
4511 · . . . . . . . 130
4512 ........ 131
4513 ....... . 131.5
4514 ........ 132
4515 · . . . . . . . 133
4516 · . . . . . . . 137.2
4517 ....... . 137.6
4518 ....... . 157

New
Former
Section
Section
Civ.C
Civ.C
5003 ........ 150.3
5004 · . . . . . . . 150.4
5100 . ....... 155
5101 ........ 156
5102 . ....... 157
5103 ........ 158
5104 ........ 161
5105 ........ 161a
5106 ........ 161b
5107 ........ 162
5108 ........ 163
5109 ........ 163.5
5110 · . . . . . . . 164
5111 ........ 164.5
5112 ........ 164.6
5113 · . . . . . . . 164.7
5113.5 ....... (new)
5114 ........ 165
5115 ........ 166
5116 ........ 167
5117 ........ 168
5118 ........ 169
5119 ........ 169.1; 169.2
5120 ........ 170
5121 ........ 171
5122 ........ 171a
5123 ........ 171b
5124 ........ 171c
5125 ........ 172
5126 ........ 169.3
5127 ........ 172a
5128 ........ 172b
5129 ........ 173
5130 ........ 174
5131 ........ 175
5132 ........ 176
5133 · . . . . . . . 177
5134 ........ 178
5135 ........ 179
5136 ........ 180
5137 ........ 181
5138 ........ 182

CCP

4519 · . . . . . . . 125
4520 ....... . (new)
Civ.C
4521 ....... . 131
4525 ... , .... 137.3
4526 ....... . 137.5
4530 · . . . . . . . 128; 128.1
4531 ....... . 129
4540 · . . . . . . . 137.2; 137.6; 139
4600 · . . . . . . . 138
4601 ....... . (new)
4602 ....... . (new)
4603 · . . . . . . . 199
4700 ....... . 139; 139.1; 139.8; 140
4701 ....... . (new)
4702 ....... . 139.5
4703 ....... . 137.1
4800 · . . . . . . . 146
4801 ....... . 139; 139.7; 139.8; 140
4802 ....... . 159; 160
4803 ....... . 140.5
4804 ....... . 140.7
4805 ....... . 141
4806 ....... . 142
4807 ....... . 143
4808 ....... . 146
4809 · . . . . . . . 147
4810 ....... . 148
4811 · . . . . . . . 139
4812 ....... . 139.1
5000 ....... . 150
5001 ....... . 150.1
5002 · . . . . . . . 150.2
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